California Jury Selection in 2026: Hazlett, Sanmiguel, the RJA, and CCP § 231.7
Quick answer: Two 2026 California Supreme Court decisions sharpen the line between the California Racial Justice Act and the state’s separate rules governing discriminatory peremptory challenges. People v. Hazlett holds that a prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge, standing alone, is not bias or animus “towards the defendant” within Penal Code section 745(a)(2). People v. Sanmiguel, applying Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, holds that when a party relies on certain behavior-based reasons that the statute treats as presumptively invalid, merely confirming that the behavior occurred is not enough; the party must explain why it mattered to the case.
For California criminal practitioners, the practical point is important: do not collapse the Racial Justice Act, section 231.7, and Batson/Wheeler into a single jury-selection test. They overlap in purpose but operate through different statutory language, burdens, and remedies.
People v. Hazlett: the RJA does not automatically convert a peremptory strike into bias “towards the defendant”
On August 27, 2026, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Hazlett (S126387). The defendant argued, among other things, that the prosecution’s jury-selection conduct violated the California Racial Justice Act.
The Court focused on Penal Code section 745(a)(2), which addresses situations in which a judge, attorney, law-enforcement officer, expert witness, or juror used racially discriminatory language about the defendant or otherwise exhibited bias or animus toward the defendant because of race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful.
The majority concluded that the exercise of a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror, standing alone, does not satisfy that particular statutory requirement because the challenged conduct is directed at the prospective juror rather than “towards the defendant.” The Court applied the same reasoning to the prosecutor’s questioning of another prospective juror who was ultimately removed for cause.
That is a significant limiting construction of section 745(a)(2). It means an attorney should not assume that every allegedly discriminatory jury-selection act is automatically an RJA violation under that subdivision simply because the act may affect the racial composition of the jury.
Hazlett does not make discriminatory jury selection lawful
The key distinction is between which statute governs the conduct and whether the conduct is permissible. California separately regulates peremptory challenges through Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7. The Legislature enacted that provision to address discrimination in jury selection using a framework different from the traditional Batson/Wheeler purposeful-discrimination model.
Hazlett therefore should not be read as a general safe harbor for discriminatory strikes. Instead, it clarifies that section 745(a)(2)’s phrase “towards the defendant” has its own statutory work to do. A jury-selection objection may still be governed directly by section 231.7, and other facts in a case may present separate RJA issues.
For a broader overview of Penal Code section 745, see the firm’s California Racial Justice Act Summary and Racial Justice Act legal resources.
People v. Sanmiguel: confirming inattentiveness is not enough
On July 30, 2026, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Sanmiguel (S287786), its first opinion addressing the statutory scheme governing peremptory challenges that took effect in 2021.
The prosecutor had used a peremptory challenge against a Latino prospective juror and gave several reasons, including that the juror appeared less attentive and engaged than others. The trial court confirmed the prosecutor’s observations and allowed the strike.
The Supreme Court held that confirmation of the behavior was not, by itself, sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption attached to certain behavior-based reasons. When a party relies on one of those reasons, the party must explain why the behavior matters in the particular case. The statute requires more than a judicial finding that the prospective juror actually looked inattentive.
The rule matters because otherwise a vague observation—such as inattentiveness, lack of eye contact, demeanor, or similar behavior—could become a proxy that is difficult to test and easy to apply unevenly.
What section 231.7 changes in practice
California’s section 231.7 framework differs from the older Batson/Wheeler approach in several important ways. The objection should be analyzed under the statute’s own text rather than treated merely as a constitutional purposeful-discrimination challenge.
Among the issues counsel should identify immediately are:
- the protected characteristic implicated by the strike;
- the exact reason stated for the peremptory challenge;
- whether the stated reason is one the statute identifies as presumptively invalid;
- whether the reason is supported by the record;
- whether the proponent explained why the stated behavior or characteristic matters in the case;
- whether similarly situated prospective jurors were treated differently;
- the sequence and pattern of questioning and strikes; and
- the trial court’s findings under the statutory framework.
Hazlett and Sanmiguel should be read together, not interchangeably
The two cases answer different questions.
| Issue | Hazlett | Sanmiguel |
|---|---|---|
| Primary statute | Penal Code § 745(a)(2), California Racial Justice Act | Code Civ. Proc. § 231.7 |
| Core question | Is jury-selection conduct, standing alone, bias or animus “towards the defendant” under this RJA subdivision? | What must a party show when relying on a presumptively invalid reason for a peremptory strike? |
| 2026 holding | A peremptory strike directed at a prospective juror, standing alone, does not satisfy the “towards the defendant” element of § 745(a)(2). | Confirming the behavior occurred is insufficient; the proponent must explain why the behavior matters in the case. |
| Practical lesson | Identify the correct RJA subdivision and do not assume every jury-selection act fits § 745(a)(2). | Make a specific record under § 231.7 and test the stated reason under the statute’s own requirements. |
Record preservation after Hazlett and Sanmiguel
These cases make the trial record even more important. A useful record should capture the exact voir dire exchange, the timing of the objection, the stated basis for the challenge, the court’s observations, any comparative-juror information, and the precise statutory ground asserted.
Where the defense believes racial bias reaches beyond the strike itself, counsel should identify the separate conduct that allegedly reflects bias toward the defendant rather than relying only on the fact that a prospective juror was questioned or struck. That may include racially discriminatory language, case-related racial stereotypes, arguments directed at the defendant, or other conduct that fits the text of Penal Code section 745.
Do not lose the distinction between an RJA claim and a section 231.7 objection
A careful motion should state which doctrine applies to which conduct. Conflating them creates avoidable problems: a court may reject a valid jury-selection issue because it was placed under the wrong statutory provision, or may apply the wrong burden because counsel used Batson/Wheeler vocabulary when section 231.7 supplied the governing test.
In a case involving both jury-selection discrimination and broader racial bias, the better approach is to preserve each theory separately and explain how the evidence supports each statutory element.
Frequently asked questions
Did Hazlett hold that the Racial Justice Act never applies to jury selection?
No. The majority addressed the statutory language before it and held that a prosecutor’s peremptory challenge, standing alone, was not bias or animus “towards the defendant” under Penal Code section 745(a)(2). The opinion should not be expanded beyond its actual holding.
Does California still prohibit discriminatory peremptory challenges?
Yes. Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 provides a separate statutory framework for objections to peremptory challenges based on protected characteristics.
What did Sanmiguel say about juror inattentiveness?
When inattentiveness or another covered behavior is used as the basis for a strike, confirming that the behavior happened does not by itself overcome the statutory presumption. The proponent must explain why that behavior matters in the case.
Is section 231.7 the same as Batson/Wheeler?
No. Section 231.7 was designed as a distinct California statutory framework and should be briefed according to its own text, standards, presumptions, and procedures rather than reduced to the traditional purposeful-discrimination analysis.
Why does this matter for an RJA motion?
Because a strong RJA motion must connect the challenged conduct to the actual elements of Penal Code section 745. After Hazlett, counsel should be especially precise about whether the theory concerns conduct directed at the defendant, racially discriminatory language, charging or sentencing disparities, or a separate jury-selection violation governed by section 231.7.
Primary sources
- People v. Hazlett, S126387 (Cal. Aug. 27, 2026).
- People v. Sanmiguel, S287786 (Cal. July 30, 2026).
- California Courts Newsroom: Confirmed Inattentiveness Insufficient to Support Peremptory (July 31, 2026).
About this resource: This article is part of The Okorocha Firm’s California criminal-law and Racial Justice Act authority library. Okorie Okorocha, JD, MS, MS is an attorney and forensic toxicologist. This material is legal education, not advice about a particular case; statutory text, subsequent history, and the complete record should be checked before filing or relying on any argument.
